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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 17037

RONALD G. CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ronald G. Clark, was charged with
the theft of three turkeys in violation of § 76-6-404 and
§ 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii)

Utah Code Annotated (1953), as

amen~ed.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On February 29, 1980 trial was held before the
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge in and for the S:ixth Judicial
District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, sitting
without a jury.

Judge Tibbs £ound the appellant guilty of

theft, a third degree felony, as charged.

On April 9, 1980

the appellant was sentenced to a term not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison and fined the sum of $1500.00.
Judge Tibbs suspended the prison sentence, and placed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellant on probation for two years upon the conditions
that the appellant serve ninety {90) days in the Juab
County Jail, make restitution in the amount of $45.00,
refrain from the use of any intoxicants, and not possess
any weapons during the term of probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the guilty verdict
rendered and of the sentence imposed, and affirmation of
the constitutionality of Section 76-6-412(1) {b)

{i~i)

Utah

Code Annotated {1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 19, 1979, at approximately 2:00 a.m.,
Richard Ray Olsen and his brother Douglas Hall Olsen were
on their turkey farm located approximately four miles north
of Ephraim, Utah.
the

appel~ant

As they were leaving their farm they saw

inside one of their fenced turkey pens {R. 16, 22).

Richard Olsen testified that he heard a truck idling, and
both brothers heard someone hitting the turkeys {R. 17, 23).
The brothers walked to the idling truck and watched
the appellant in their turkey pens {R. 17).

The appellant

approached the two brothers carrying three dead turkeys {R. 17,
23).

The brothers confronted the appellant asking him what

he was doing (R. 18, 23).

Appellant dropped the turkeys and

replied, "I'm just picking up dead turkeys."

(R. 18, 23).
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A substantial discussion between the appellant
and the two brothers followed, lasting for almost three
hours (R. 19) , during which time the appellant denied any
wrong doing (R. 24).

Douglas Olsen finally left the turkey

farm to notify the sheriff (R. 26) when it appeared that
the appellant would not let the Olsens "take him in." (R. 20).
Appellant was finally arrested in Ephraim after he followed
Richard Olsen into town (R. 20) .
Appellant was charged with violating Sections
76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended to which he entered a plea of not guilty.

In

addition to the testimony of the Olsen brothers, the testimony
of the investigating officer was stipulated to.

Officer

Buchanan would have testified that boots taken from the
defendant had fresh blood on them, and that he found a base
ball bat in the turkey pen with fresh blood on it (R. 30) .
Appellant's counsel had no objection to the admission of the
proffered testimony (R. 30).
After the prosecution rested its case, the appellant
moved to have the information dismissed on the ground the
state had failed to meet the elements of the crime of theft
(R. 31).

This motion was denied and the case submitted to the

court (R. 32).
The trial judge found the appellant guilty of theft
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as charged (R. 33).

Although appellant's counsel was willing

to waive the time for sentencing, the court ordered a presentence investigation and report (R. 35).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 76-6-412 (1) (b} .{iii} U.C.A. (1953),
AS AMENDED, DOES Nor VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION.
Appellant contends that Section 76-6-412 (1) (b} (iii)
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, which classifies the
theft of livestock, including poultry, as a third degree
felony, denies equal protection in that it makes no reference
to the value of the animals stolen in determining the felonious
nature of the offense.

It is respondent's position that the

legislative classification is reasonable, and therefore the
statute does not deny equal protection under either the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Utah.
Although appellant correctly cites State v. Logan,
563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that market
value is the appropriate test to be used in determining the
value of stolen property, appellant has failed to cite the
entire language of Logan.

This Court in Logan stated:

In general, the common law gradation
of the offense of larceny that is
based on the value of the property
stolen has been retained in most
jurisdictions, and in the absence
of statutes providing otherwise, the
measure of the value is its fair
market value at the time and place
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
where
the alleged crime was committed.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Id. at 813.

The language of Logan indicates that market

value is to be used only if there is no statute, "providing
otherwise."

Such is not the case here.

In this case a

specific statutory provision classifies the theft of animals,
including poultry, as a third degree felony.

Specific statutes

making theft a felony regardless of the value of the thing
stolen have consistently been held valid.

See 52A C.J.S. §62.

In states having statutes similar to Utah's livestock
theft statute, Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) U.C.A., challenges
based on equal protection have failed.

In People v. Burns,

593 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1979), the Colorado Supreme Court confronted
an identical challenge to the one before this Court.

The

appellant in Burns was convicted of the theft of a calf.
On appeal, appellant contended that the Colorado "theft of
animals" statute which classified the theft as a felony, was
unconstitutional.

The appellant claimed that the value of

the calf was $40-50 and therefore he would only be guilty of
a misdemeanor, but for the specific "theft of animals" statute.
Like the appellant in the instant case, Burns argued that
such a distinction deprived him of equal protection of the
law.

The Colorado Court rejected his argument stating:
We find this challenge to be without merit. An equal protection problem
arises only where different statutes
prescribe different penalties for the
same conduct. However, the theft of
animals statute relates specifically
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. to theft of animals, conduct which
is distinguishable from theft of
other articles. This distinction
has been made by the legislature,
which obviously has concluded that
theft of animals is a crime of
greater consequence to society in
this state than a general theft and
that it requires a greater penalty.
In People v. Czajkowski, 193
Colo. 352, 568 P.2d 23 (1977), we
addressed the same challenge with
respect to the ·"theft of auto parts"
statute. We said there:
"Simply because an act may
violate more than one statutory
provision does not invalidate the
legislation in question, so long
as the legislative classification
is not arbitrary or unreasonable,
and the differences in the provisions
bear a reasonable relationship to
the persons included and the public
policy to be achieved. [Citations
omitted.]" 568 P.2d at 25.
The Czajkowski rationale is
controlling here. We do not think
that the distinction made by the
legislature between a general theft
and theft of animals is arbitrary or
unreasonable.
Rather, it displays a
legitimate legislative judgment. Thus
there is no violation of equal protection here.
People v. Marshall, Colo.,
5 8 6 p • 2d 41 ( 19 7 8 ) .
Id. at 353.

[Footnotes omitted]

(emphasis added) .

Likewise in State v. Webb, 528 P.2d 669 (Idaho 1974),
the appellant argued that classifying theft of livestock,
regardless of value, into one class for the purpose of fixing
the degree of the offense was unreasonable, arbitrary, and
discriminatory.

In affirming the constitutionality of the
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Idaho statute, the Court reviewed the history of the
legislation:
Since territorial times Idaho has
consistently treated the larceny of
livestock differently from larceny of
other personalty, in that the punishment
for larceny of livestock has not been
dependent on the monetary value of the
property taken.
[Citations omitted]
Other states have affirmed the validity
of statutes specifically classifying
the larceny of livestock separately and
providing harsher penalties than for
other types of larceny. See, State v.
Pacheco, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521 (Ct.
App. 1969); People v. Andrich, 135 Cal.
App. 274, 26 P.2d 902 (1933). Historically,
the protection of certain classes of
property, in this case livestock, was
considered essential to deter a type of
theft easy of commission, but difficult
to detect.
Legislatures are accorded wide discretion in both the classification of
subject matter to be protected by criminal
laws and in the establishment of punishments for the violation of such criminal
laws.
Id. at 670.

The Idaho Court determined that the classification

of livestock theft was reasonable, stating:
The legislature specifically designated larceny of livestock as an "evil"
to be regulated with stricter penalties
than other types of larceny. The separate
classification of larceny of livestock bears
a reasonable relationship to the protection
of an industry difficult to safeguard while
marking a class of of fenders which experience
dictates as deserving special treatment.
We find no merit in the defendant's
argument that the legislature's specific
classification of larceny for livestock with
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resulting harsher penalties in relation
to other degrees of larceny deprived him
of any constitutional safeguards or rights.
Id. at 671.
The Utah legislature has similarly determined
that theft of livestock is an "eviln requiring harsher
penalties than other thefts.

Separate classifications for

livestock have been in effect- in Utah since 1876.
This Court stated in In re Gannett, 11 U. 283,

39 P. 496 (Utah 1895):
The degree of such an offense does
not depend on the value of the property
stolen, because it is made grand larceny
byt the statute, regardless of value, and
must be punished likewise.
Id. at 497.

(Emphasis added.)

Appellant also argues that Section 76-6-412(1) (bl (iii)i
Utah Code Annotated (1953) , as amended violates equal

·

protection because it allows a prosecutor to charge either
a felony or a misdemeanor on the same set of £acts.

However,

as long as there exists a reasonable basis for distinguishing
between theft of animals and theft based on the value of the
object taken, the fact that an act can be either a felony
or misdemeanor does not create a constitutional objection,
nor does it confer upon the defendant a constitutional right
to be prosecuted for a misdemeanor.

State v. Dumont, 471

P.2d 847 (Ore.App. 1970).
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I

I

The legislature has determined that the theft
of livestock, including poultry is a more severe offense
than the theft of three frozen turkeys from a supermarket.
The distinction is both reasonable and rationale.

As the

New Mexico Court stated in State v. Pacheco, 463 P.2d 521

(1969):
. . . the larceny of livestock statute
was apparently enacted to protect the
ownership of thereof, to prevent a kind
of larceny peculiarly easy of commission
and difficult of discovery and punishment,
and to protect the important industry of
stock raising.
Id. at 524.
The classification

of theft of livestock as a

third degree felony regardless of the value of the animals
is a reasonable legislative distinction, and as such is
not a violation of equal protection.

Respondent respectfully

asks this Court to reject appellant's constitutional challenge
and to affirm the constitutionality of Section 76-6-412(1) (b)
(iii) •
POINT II
SECTION 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SINCE IT APPLIES
EQUALLY TO ALL CITIZENS; NOR IS IT
A SPECIAL LAW IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
VI, SECTION 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH.
Appellant asserts that Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii)
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, is a private or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

special law contrary to Article VI, Section 26 of the
Constitution of Utah.

Respondent submits that the statute

is a general law, therefore the statute is constitutional
since it applies equally to all persons who steal livestock
in the State of Utah.

Furthermore, legislative enactments

are presumed valid absent a showing that the legislature
went beyond the Constitution.
In McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center,
603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979), this Court wrote:
In Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Assoc., 564
P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), this Court defined
a general law as one which applies to
and operates uniformly upon all members
of any class of persons.
Id at 788.
Such is the case with the Utah livestock statute.
All persons who steal livestock in Utah are subject to
prosecution under Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code
Annotated.

The statute does not rest on an arbitrary

classification, nor does it invidiously discriminate.

In

a similar challenge to the one now before this Court, the
appellant in State v. Pacheco, 463 P.2d 521 (New Mexico
App. 1969) argued that the theft of livestock statute
under which he was sentenced violated the special legislation
provisions of the Constitution of New Mexico.

The challenged

provision of the New Mexico Constitution is comparable to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution.

In

rejecting the appellant's claim the court found that the
portion of the larceny statute making it a felony to steal
livestock regardless of its value thereof applied to all
persons who steal livestock in New Mexico and therefore
did not constitute special legislation contrary to the
New Mexico Constitution.
Furthermore, appellant's contentions that the
statute was enacted as a result of special interest lobbying
is an argument which can be applied to many kinds of legislation.

An individual selling real estate without a license

would be able to assert that the licensing requirement was a
special law enacted by the legislature in response to efforts
by realtors to limit their numbers.

Adoption of appellant's

argument would open the floodgates to claims of "special
laws."
Finally appellant has merely speculated that the
legislature amended Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) to include
poultry because of lobbying efforts.

It cannot be assumed

that the legislature acted without exercising its own discretion.
As the New Mexico Court said in Pacheco, supra:
Every presumption is to be indulged
in favor of the validity and regularity
of legislation, and it will not be declared
unconstitutional, unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the
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Legislature went outside the Constitution
in enacting it.
[Citations omitted.}
Id. at 523.
Since the statute applies equally to all people,
and appellant has failed to show that the legislature went
beyond the Constitution in enacting this statute, this
Court should reject appellant's claim that Section 76-6-412
(1) (b) (iii) is a special law in violation of Article VI,
Section 26 of the Constitution of Utah.
POINT III
A SENTENCE WITHIN STATUTORY LIMITS
IS NOT EXCESSIVE WHERE THE APPELLANT
FAILS TO SHOW CLEAR JUDICIAL ABUSE.
Appellant was found guilty of theft, a third degree
felony under Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended.

Section 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated

(1953) provides:
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term as follows . . •
(3) In the case of a felony of a
third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years . . .
Furthermore, Section 76-3-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
states:
A person who has been convicted of an
offense may be sentenced to pay a fine
not exceedinq:
(2) $5000:00 when the conviction is
of a felony of the third degree.
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Lastly Section 76-3-201(3) (a) Utah Code Annotated (1953)
states:
When a person is adjudged guilty of
criminal activities which have resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to
any other sentence it may impose; the
court may order that the defendant make
restitution to the victim.
Appellant contends that the sentence of the court
was excessive and arbitrarily and prejudicially imposed.
However under applicable Utah law, the appellant was sentenced
within the limits imposed by statute.

Respondent asserts that

absent a showing of judicial abuse, a sentence within statutory
limits is neither excessive nor arbitrary.

Appellant has

failed to show any judicial abuse, therefore respondent
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's
sentence.
In State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978), the
appellant pled guilty to a reduced charge in anticipation of
probation.

The trial judge refused to allow him to withdraw

his guilty plea and instead sentenced him.

Although the

issues on appeal differed from those in the instant case,
this Court in Harris pronounced the general rule with r.egard
to sentencing:
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by
verdict or by plea, the matter of the
sentence to be imposed rests entirely
within the discretion of the court,
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within the limits prescribed by law.
Id. at 453 (Emphasis added.)
This statement is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions.

The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Ward,

569 P.2d 916 (Idaho 1977), stated:
This court has long held that
sentencing is generally within the
trial court's discretion and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless
a clear.abuse of discretion is shown,
and that ordinarily there is no abuse
of discretion where the sentence is
within its statutory limit.
Id at 920.

(Emphasis added.)

See also Hanson v. State,

590 P.2d 832 (Wyoming 1979); State v. Whitehead, 596 P.2d
370 (Ariz. 1979).
The appellant has failed to meet his burden of
showing that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion.
State v. Seifart, 597 P.2d 44 (Idaho 1979).

The statement

by the trial judge that he wanted to make an example of
appellant, cannot be viewed as jud-.ical abuse.

As was stated

in People v. McKnight, 588 P.2d 886 (Colorado App. 1978):
Punishment of an offender, protection
of society, and rehabilitation of an
of fender are not the only reasons for
incarceration; deterrence of similar
acts by others is also a consideration.
[Citations omitted.]
Id. at 888 (emphasis added).
Similarly in State v. Adams, 577 P.2d 1123 (Idaho
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1978), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the appellant's
sentence saying:
The district court acknowledged that the
sentence would be of no rehabilitative
value to the defendant, but nevertheless
imposed the two year period of incarceration
in order to deter others from committing
similar offenses. General deterrence is
one of the several objectives of criminal
punishment and has been held to be a
sufficient reason for imposing a prison
sent~.
[Footnotes omitted].
Id. at 1124 (emphasis added).
The appellant was found guilty of a third degree
felony and was sentenced within the limits prescribed by
law.

Consequently, absent a showing of clear judicial abuse,

this sentence should be affirmed.
show any abuse by the trial judge.

Appellant has failed to
Furthermore, the mere

fact that the sentence may be harsh does not make it an
abuse of discretion.

Finally it should be noted that although

a third degree felony carries the possibility of five years
imprisonment and a maximum fine of $5000 .. 00, the appellant's
prison sentence was suspended, and probation imposed.

Appellant

should not be heard to challenge his punishment as excessive
when it falls far below the maximum possible penalty.
For the aboveforementioned reasons, respondent
respectfully asks this Court to deny appellant's claim and
to affirm the trial court's sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the foregoing points and
authorities support the constitutionality of Section 76-6-412
(1) (b) (iii) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, and the
actions of the trial court in sentencing the appellant.
Therefore, respondent respectfully asks this Court to affirm
the appellant's conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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